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Abstract
This chapter is about weak business climate as a cause for foreign direct divest-
ment. The aim is to show the connection between a poor business climate and 
foreign direct divestment. The methodology used entails a review of the different 
factors of the business climate such as the ease to do business, corruption, and rule 
of law. A review of the UNCTAD foreign direct investment flow as compared to the 
business climate indicators to determine a pattern is also part of the methodology. 
The chapter highlights the externalities of foreign direct divestment and suggests 
some ideas to overcome the global negative impact of foreign direct divestment as 
it is estimated to be significant in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. The 
conclusion is that foreign direct divestments can occur for different factors, some 
internal and some external. Weak business climates seem to play a role in a decision 
to divest an investment but there is no direct correlation.
Keywords: business climate, foreign direct divestment, weak business climate, 
factors of foreign direct divestment, universal wealth fund
1. Introduction
Foreign direct investments (FDIs) are defined as transfer of capital from one 
country to other where the investor has control or a significant degree of influence 
on the management of a business located in the host country [1].
Foreign Direct Divestment (FDD) are defined as an adjustment in the ownership 
of a business that involves the partial or full disposal of an asset or a business unit [2].
The theory of economic development shows that capital is one essential piece 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth. The reasoning is that more FDI helps in 
GDP growth whereas more FDD affects the GDP growth [3].
To understand the dynamic of the FDI process and the FDD process it seems 
external factors play an essential role on determining the decision to invest or the 
decision to divest.
The literature defines business or investment climate multifold. In general, usage 
of the term falls into three major categories: (1) an overall measure of growth or 
business health in a region; (2) a set of factors believed to contribute to regional 
economic growth; and (3) an intangible asset in the form of a regional reputation 
for business friendliness and receptiveness to growth [4].
In that continuum, efficient regulations, transparency, rule of law, strong 
institutions, low operating costs and predictability, inter alia, are all elements that 
can enhance the appeal to foreign investors. That premise assumes that previous 
conditions need to be in place: business opportunities and a positive cost/benefit 
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equation. However, the opposite seems to be true: poor business climates where the 
rule of law is weak, corruption is pervasive, costs of doing business are high and 
unpredictable and transparency and predictability are absent appear to deter an 
investment decision.
This chapter is about the business climate as a relevant factor that drives FDD. 
Overall the methodology followed is this: review of indicators of business climate 
factors. Similarly, the FDI rankings are reviewed. It is sought to find a pattern 
between weak indicators of business climate factors and low flow of FDI. For that 
purpose, some countries’ rankings on doing business, corruption perception index, 
and rule of law index are reviewed.
The second section highlights the factors that trigger FDI. By looking at the 
relevant data, it is intended to stress that a better business climate ranking contrib-
utes to boost FDI flows.
The third section shows the opposite: a weak business climate fosters FDD. A 
country will have a weak business climate when it is ranked in the lowest range on 
Doing Business, Corruption Perception Index and the Rule of Law Index.
The fourth section highlights the externalities of FDD. Just as FDI is considered 
to bring about externalities such as job creation and productivity enhancement, a 
connection between FDD and loss of jobs and GDP shrinking is explored.
The fifth section makes some suggestions to mitigate the impact of FDD 
externalities. As this essay is written during the COVID-19 pandemic it is assumed 
that FDD negative externalities will be more significant globally and hence global 
remedies might be needed.
The sixth section contains the conclusions. Combining the analysis of the data 
with some empirical observations certain conclusions are reached as regards to the 
connection of business climate and FDD as well as to some suggestions to mitigate 
the FDD externalities.
The seventh section contains the references.
2. Factors that trigger FDI
Foreign direct investments (FDIs) have been considered an important tool for 
economic development [5].
FDIs bring about not only capital and jobs to the host countries but also enhance 
the economic apparatus directly and indirectly in areas such as innovation, cultural 
trends and even language use [6].
FDIs can be considered the historic equivalent of territory conquests. Like that 
possibly overextended analogy, the rationale behind the conquests are multifold. In 
the case of FDIs, the reason for expanding overseas can be strategic or tactical going 
from market reach, factory allocation, costs reduction, profit enhancement, trend 
following, merger, competitors chase, trademark protection, etc.
From an economic efficiency standpoint FDIs should be assumed to be con-
ducted when the benefits exceed the costs. That does not occur all the times as some 
of the benefits of FDIs can differ depending on the rationale behind. In a compli-
cated world and with FDI actors as varied as they area and with interests as varied as 
they could be, the benefits could be difficult to measure. For example, State owned 
investors could have geopolitical interests in an investment. Hence, measuring the 
FDI benefit merely by the existence of profit could yield a wrong conclusion.
Thus, the factors that trigger FDIs are inexorably connected to the subjacent 
interests. However, the data that is available measures the FDI that is homogeneous, 
meaning FDIs where the interests are primarily economic and where the efficiency 
tends to be of the essence, i.e., costs do not exceed the benefits.
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In that continuum FDI flow is linked to a positive business climate. That is, there 
is a correlation between a good business climate and high levels of FDI.
An analysis of a business climate combines factors extrinsic to the business 
that impact the success or failure of the operation. Factors such as costs and time 
of doing business, including permits to operate or hire, physical and human infra-
structure, corruption, rule of law, governance and political stability are all part of 
the overall analysis of the framework of a business climate.
Countries tend to attract more FDIs when it is easier, cheaper and faster to do 
business, when corruption is low and when the rule of law is prevalent. Table 1 
about ranking of FDI inflow recipients show the rankings of selected countries in 
relevant factors of business climate. It shows that the top 5 FDI inflow recipients 
perform above average in some business climate factors’ rankings.
A case of point is Jordan. It has been implementing significant changes to ease 
doing business in areas such as getting credit, paying taxes and resolving insolven-
cies. The Doing Business indicators, scores and rankings, have been improving in 
consecutive years. Inflow FDIs have increased from $1600 million to $2030 million 
in 3 years up to year 2017. Jordan improved its Doing Business ranking in more than 
10% in 3 years (UNCTAD World Investment Report and Doing Business).
Of course, correlation makes sense when the world economy is growing, and 
GDP is not contracted, when there is no world economic recession and when the 
economic resources of the country are not limited.
3. The impact of a weak business climate
In circumstances of economic expansion there seems to be a correlation between 
weak business climates and low FDIs.
The empirical evidence shows that in the absence of strong business climate the 
host countries are more prone to attract less FDI.
For example, when the rule of law is weak FDI inflow tends to be low. Table 2 
about the rule of law index rankings and FDI inflows shows the amount of FDI 
attracted by countries ranked at the bottom on rule of law.
When transparency is low, FDI tends to be low. Table 3 about the corruption 
perception index rankings and FDI inflows shows the amount of FDI attracted by 
countries ranked at the bottom on corruption.










Rule of law index 
ranking
Total: 128
The USA 1 6 23 21
China 2 31/ 3 (Hong Kong) 80/16(Hong Kong) 88/16 (Hong Kong)
Singapore 3 2 4 12
The Netherlands 4 42 8 5
The United 
Kingdom
5 8 12 13
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When economic freedom is restricted, FDI tends to be low. Table 4 about the 
economic freedom index rankings and FDI inflows shows the amount of FDI 
attracted by countries ranked at the bottom on economic freedom.
When doing business is difficult, FDI tends to be low. Table 5 about the ease 
of doing business rankings and FDI inflows shows the amount of FDI attracted by 
countries ranked at the bottom on ease to do business.
4. Negative externalities of FDD
FDIs are poverty alleviation weapons. The benefits of FDIs have been consen-
sually accepted to be vast and broad. The range goes from job creation, cluster 







Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report [7] and Transparency International [9].
Table 3. 
Year 2019.
Country Rule of law index ranking FDI inflow amount (in millions of US dollars)
Congo, D.R. 124 1494
Afghanistan 123 139
Mauritania 122 71
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report [7] and WJP Rule of Law index.
Table 2. 
Year 2018.
Country Economic freedom index ranking FDI inflow amount (in millions of US dollars)
North Korea 180 N/A
Cuba 178 2134
Eritrea 177 61
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report [7] and Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index [11].
Table 4. 
Year 2019.




Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report [7] and Doing Business [8].
Table 5. 
Year 2019.
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creation, education enhancement, food improvement, infrastructure development, 
tourism recognition, technology transfer and commerce catalyst up to political 
stability and social peace.
FDI can also fill, first, the “investment gap” by providing the much-needed 
capital for domestic investment; secondly, the “foreign exchange gap” by provid-
ing foreign currency through initial investments and subsequent export earnings; 
and finally, the “tax revenue gap” by generating tax revenues through creation of 
additional economic activities [12].
The contrary is also true. FDIs are defined by control of a foreign entity of a busi-
ness operation beyond the borders of origin. That control usually takes the form of 
ownership but it is not an exclusive trait to fulfill the goal. When control of the foreign 
operation ceases totally or partially by change, reduction or suppression of the activity 
or ownership a foreign direct divestment (FDD) can be deemed to have occurred [13].
FDD can be motivated by internal reasons. Those internal reasons can be 
intrinsic to the whole business undertaking or internal to the local operation. 
They include tactical ones, such as geographic location advantage or disadvantage, 
financial maneuvering, business structure, or limited resources as well as strategic 
ones such as market reach, competitors challenge, and product development [14].
FDDs can also be motivated by external reasons. A weak business climate where 
rules are not respected and predictable and where doing business is not efficient 
might the strongest determinant to FDD (Figure 1).
Thus, excessive corruption which makes costs, times and procedure outcomes 
unpredictable can be a deterrent of FDI. However, the evidence shows that effi-
ciency, i.e., less costs, more benefits, is the determinant external factor of FDI. The 
opposite, absence of efficiency, i.e., more costs, less benefits, could be a determi-
nant factor of FDD. Hence, a correlation between difficulty of doing business and 
low FDI is prevalent.
A relevant example on this point is Angola. Angola has worsened its ranking and 
scores in the Doing Business indicators. Two of the indicators, enforcing contracts 
and obtaining credit have worsened during the period lapsing from the year 2015. 
During that period the FDI inflow have gone from $10,028 million to $ − 5732 
 million in 2018 (UNCTAD World Investment Report, Doing Business).
With FDD the host countries can suffer significantly in economic, social, and 
political terms. A fleeing capital that has been significant in terms of GDP and that 
Figure 1. 
The role of host country investment climate factors. Source: Borga et al. [15].
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is not substituted with other capital makes locals lose jobs, makes local small busi-
nesses vanish, and brings about losses in fiscal income, among other consequences. 
More significantly, the impact in the host country can also have social repercussions 
such as riots, violence and unrest as well as political instability.
Countries with low FDI are usually exporters of migrants. Table 6 about FDI 
inflows and number of refugees shows the amount of FDI attracted by countries 
with most outgoing refugees.
With lack of incentives to prosper economically countries with low FDI are also 
more unlikely to adopt environmental friendly policies. Table 7 about FDI inflows 
and environmental performance index shows the amount of FDI attracted by 
countries with poor environmental performance.
Home countries are not necessarily the beneficiaries of FDD. The capital that 
flew away from a host country can go to another one. It might not be significant 
to impact in the GDP of the home country, nor to create more jobs, enhance the 
home country productivity or to gross up the home country’s treasury. However, 
the global impact of massive FDDs can worsen the inequality, flows of refugees and 
global warming.
5. Remedies to FDD negative externalities
FDIs pursue many purposes, one of which is profit seeking. Investors might 
still achieve that goal after a FDD has taken place and host countries might not 
necessarily face all the negative externalities of FDDs if certain global policies are 
implemented.
5.1 ESGF
Setting up a global Environment Social and Governance Fund (ESGF) through 
a multilateral entity could mitigate the negative externalities of FDDs. The ESGF 
could endow with private capital, such as proceeds from FDD and/or open to all 
types of capital. The capital that is not invested in FDIs could still be beneficial 
Country FDI inflow amount (in millions of US dollars) Refugees
Syria N/A 5.6 million
Afghanistan 139 2.7 million
South Sudan N/A 2.3 million
Myanmar 3554 1.1 million
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report [7] and World Vision [16].
Table 6. 
Year 2019.
Country FDI inflow amount (in millions of US dollars) Environmental performance index
Burundi 1 180
Bangladesh 3613 179
Congo, D.R. 1494 178
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report [7] and Environmental Performance Index [17].
Table 7. 
Year 2018.
7Business Climate: When Weakness Means Foreign Direct Divestment
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.93291
to developing countries. Investors in search of profits could be benefitted, albeit 
without controlling the investment in a modality much more similar to portfolio 
investments.
The ESGF will make impact investments in different types of international 
business opportunities that are environmentally friendly, socially beneficial, and 
well governed. Home countries could play a role suggesting or encouraging owners 
of the FDD returning capital to devote a portion of the capital to the ESGF perhaps 
under certain tax arrangements, such as tax benefits to be granted to investors who 
devote capital to the ESGF.
The ESGF in turn could grant money to countries falling under certain eco-
nomic category provided they fulfill certain objectives in environmental, social 
and governance policies. For example, if a country can increase its ranking in the 
rule of law index more than 10% every year for 2 years, the country can be entitled 
to participate in requests for grants from the ESGF. The grants will be disbursed on 
condition of maintaining certain conditions and developing programs devoted to 
mitigating the externalities of FDDs.
5.2 From UBI to UWF
The global economic, social and political consequences of the COVID-19 
pandemic are still to be seen. It might easily happen that FDDs will occur not as a 
consequence of weak business climates but because of a global economic recession, 
lack of demand, or irrelevance of supplies. The same externalities of FDDs could be 
suffered by most countries.
Universal Basic Income (UBI) has been widely recommended as a measure 
to alleviate the needs of the poor. UBI has received recent publicity as a possible 
remedy to alleviate the needs of many during the pandemic crisis. The rationale 
behind the UBI is that people under certain conditions will receive a fixed amount 
of money. Once spent the UBI is evaporated and there is no legal right to it. Bluntly, 
it is a donation by the government.
A complementary concept might be useful: Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) with 
a more ambitious twist. SWFs are investment funds created and commonly owned 
by sovereign States to maximize the profits of their wealth usually but not neces-
sarily yielding from commodities. Currently, there are more than 90 SWFs holding 
more $8 trillion [18].
SWFs have been highly profitable. For example, the Norway Government 
Pension Fund Global is the largest SWF, created in 1990 and currently holding more 
than $1 trillion. It has generated an average annual return of 6% since 1998 [19].
Many SWFs have been created mainly for purposes different than direct social 
benefits to the citizens of the owner States, such as macroeconomic policies [20]. 
However, in general, people receive proceeds from SWFs investments directly 
or indirectly, even in seemingly citizens’ remote circumstances as managing the 
 balance of payments [21].
The Alaska Permanent Fund is an example of a SWF where there is a direct ben-
efit to the citizens as returns are distributed through a citizens’ dividend program 
under certain conditions. It was established in the Alaska Constitution in 1976 and 
managed by a state-owned corporation, the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation 
(APFC). It is endowed from the proceeds of oil. It distributes its returns through 
a citizens’ dividend program. The fund currently holds over $66 billion in assets. 
It has paid up to $2072 in dividends.
The negative externalities of FDDs will be more prevalent in the aftermath 
of the COVID-19 crisis. The impact of the global recession and reduction of the 
demand is likely to be reflected in massive FDD. Developing countries will suffer 
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significantly economically and socially at a minimum. The chaos of many devel-
oping countries struggling with basic needs can in turn deteriorate the business 
climates to further affect the flow of FDD.
Thus, inspired by the SWF, a Universal Wealth Fund (UWF or 3UF) could be 
established through multilateral arrangements. It could be set up to mitigate not 
only the effects of a surge of FDD but also the global economic and social damage 
post COVID-19.
The 3UF could be endowed by countries, by corporations and by NGOs. The 
corporations could make their contributions directly from the capital of the 
FDD or as some kind of tax planning tool or even as some kind of fine or penalty 
mitigation when they are punished or fined by multilateral entities such as the 
European Union.
Proceeds could be distributed directly to countries under condition that they 
are either invested in social projects and/or turn to the citizens in form of dividends 
which could be structured in terms of legal rights to which they are entitled. As 
opposed to UBI which are discretionary, rights to 3UF dividends can benefit large 
scale capitalization, financial literacy, and governance of the 3UF.
Be it as it may, the disadvantages of FDD to host developing countries could 
be mitigated. It was important before; it is more important in the world after the 
COVID-19 crisis.
6. Conclusions
FDIs are important tools for economic development. FDIs entail capital transfer 
to host countries which sometimes starve of funding to provide for the wellbeing of 
their citizens. Through FDIs many developing countries can ameliorate the impact 
of the poverty in the social and economic realms. Jobs are created, local business 
emerge, more public revenues can be collected, physical infrastructure is enhanced, 
human infrastructure is benefited, and the host country’s branding can emerge as a 
favorable place to invest, among others.
The FDI process is complex as is the decision to invest. Many factors play a 
determinant role in FDIs. Internal and external factors of different nature can push 
the capital inside or outside the host country. Among the external factors, business 
climate plays a crucial role. The combination of external factors that is commonly 
known as business climate relates to all the host country’s conditions that make the 
business easy to operate, diminish the costs and sets up in advance the rules under 
which the business will function. Unpredictability of rules, costs, and processes 
are usually contrary to FDIs. However, even in conditions of difficult, expensive, 
and lengthy conditions to do business, corruption, and weak rule of law, FDIs flow, 
albeit somehow diminished.
Countries that receive the most FDIs are ranked above average in the Doing 
Business indicator, Corruption Perception index and Rule of Law index. On the 
contrary the countries that are badly ranked in those indexes have attracted a lower 
amount of FDI.
The empirical evidence shows that in the absence of strong business climate the 
host countries are more prone to attract less FDI. That is the case with the Doing 
Business indicator, the Corruption Perception indicator, and the Rule of Law 
indicator.
It can be concluded that excessive corruption which makes costs, times, and 
procedure outcomes unpredictable can be a deterrent of FDI. However, the evidence 
shows that efficiency, i.e., less costs, more benefits, is the determinant external 
factor of FDI. The opposite, low efficiency, could be a determinant factor of FDD.
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The correlation between weak business climates and FDD is noticeable although 
not determinant. As FDD decisions are dependent on internal factors of the investor 
as well, a conclusion on a direct relation between weak business climates and FDD 
cannot be reached. However, the evidence shows that absence of efficiency, i.e., 
more costs, less benefits, could be a determinant factor of FDD.
The impact of FDD is somehow the reverse of the benefits of FDI for the host 
countries. FDDs can also bring about negative externalities to the home countries 
under the form of migrants and deteriorated environment.
At a global level, investment funds can play a role to mitigate the impact of 
FDDs. A multilateral fund devoted to environmental and social projects properly 
governed can be established in a way that appeals the outflow capital resulting 
from the FDD. The profits could in turn be offered to countries that satisfy cer-
tain requirements and conditioned to be invested in projects devoted to reducing 
poverty or other FDD negative externalities. Similarly, an unprecedented universal 
Sovereign Wealth Fund could also mitigate the negative impact of massive capital 
mobilization from poor counties. In the seemingly critical times that will follow the 
COVID-19 pandemic, global policy makers need to be creative in large scale to long 
term sustainable solutions for all.
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